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14 January 1953

ITEM 1

FSB Status Report to NSC on the Psychological Program as of
December 31, 1952
(FSB D-35)

Summary: This is the report of the status of national psychological programs as of 31 December 1952, prepared at the request of the National Security Council.

The CIA section (Annex C) will be given selective distribution on a need-to-know basis.

You may wish to read the CIA section (12 pages)--which is tabbed for your convenience--and the over-all summary of the paper on pages 3 to 7.

Recommendation: That you approve the report.

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ITEM 2

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Summary: You will recall that there have been several efforts to prepare an evaluation of the U. S. psychological effort in Italy. This latest presentation was developed by the PSB Evaluation Staff after securing separate reports from the departments and agencies. State Department believes that the current report herewith submitted is inadequate and in some respects reflects inaccurate evaluations, both as to fact and opinion.

It has been agreed among the departments and agencies, therefore, that the Board should accept the report as an initial test case effort in evaluation procedure.

Recommendation: That you agree to withholding formal approval and accept the evaluation on a test case basis.

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ITEM 4

Psychological Strategy Plan for the Middle East
(PSB D-22)

Summary: This plan has been in the process of development for almost a year, with CIA participating. The first 18 pages are a digest of the plan; objectives and basic tasks are set forth, and illustrative actions and general guidance as to timing and phasing are given. This is one of the first plans developed under the new planning format, and is more readable and usable in this form.

The CIA staff believes this plan offers valuable guidance and that it can be regarded as a professional product. It wishes to emphasize, however, the statement on page 15 of the plan that pure psychological manipulation will be of slight value until certain U. S. policies to which the Arabs take exception are changed. For specific policies your attention is invited to the "Feasibility Factors" paragraph on page 6 of Annex A.

A few minor editorial revisions are required which it would appear within the competence of the Director of the PSB to approve. It is suggested that the Board delegate this responsibility to him in this instance.

Recommendation: That you express Agency approval of the Psychological Strategy Plan for the Middle East.

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ITEM 5

Berlin Supplement to the National Psychological Strategy
with Respect to Germany
(PSB D-21/2)

Summary: The Director, PSB, forwards to the Board for approval a plan for national psychological strategy with respect to Berlin. This paper supplements the Germany plan and supersedes the portions concerned with the situation in Berlin.

In paragraph 5, page 4, five possible contingencies are listed with the provision that except for contingency "A"—if Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded—the actions are subject to modification as the contingencies arise. The Department of Defense may recommend the deletion of all action assignments to the tasks. The CIA staff believes this would considerably weaken the plan and that Defense objections could be met by a resolution, as was done for the [REDACTED], that the actions listed are permissive rather than mandatory and are listed to assign responsibility and to guarantee integrated approach. As general guidance for operational planning, the tasks are by no means limited or exclusive.

The CIA staff considers that "action" denotes primary interest and responsibility, that "support" denotes subsidiary and complementary responsibility, and that the listing of two agencies under action indicates joint and equal responsibility.

Recommendation: That you approve the Berlin Supplement to the Germany

Plan.

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ITEM 6

Psychological Strategy Plan for Southeast Asia
(PSB D-23)

Summary: The Director of PSB forwards this plan with the recognition that it has shortcomings, but asks that the Board approve it in principle and handle revisions as corrigenda to the basic paper.

The principal value of the paper is the listing in Sections V and VI of psychological objectives and undertakings for Southeast Asia designed to integrate the attack against Communism in this area and to amplify the policies established in NSC 124/2.

The CIA staff believes that Section IV, B.7, (page 6), of the plan limits the freedom of action of the 10/2 and 10/5 committees. Substitution of the attachment for the existing paragraph is recommended.

The staff feels that the paper in general would be improved by more precise language and by further revision.

CIA is informed that Defense plans to ask that the paper be referred back to the panel for further development. In view of the above comments, it is recommended that CIA concur with Defense.

Recommendation: That you offer the attached substitution for Section IV, B.7, and concur in the Defense recommendation that the Southeast Asia plan be returned to the panel for further development.

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SECTION IV (page 6)

D. 7. U. S. Government operations in Southeast Asia must take into consideration two factors (See Appendix A--Favorable and adverse psychological circumstances) which dominate the political psychology of the area;

a. The emotion of nationalism which pervades the thinking of politically conscious elements creating suspicion of all foreign (Western) assistance programs and activities,

b. The spirit of independence, which makes political leaders extremely sensitive to any implication that they are dependent on foreign (Western) advice or guidance.

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